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NoTES AND CommNs
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-RESISTING ARREST
UNDER A DEFECTIVE WARRANT
The purpose of this note is to examine the effect that an arrest
under a defective warrant1 has upon the rights of the accused
party upon whom it is being served. Preliminary to such an
examination it is necessary to enter upon a brief discussion con-
cerning the fundamental principles of law which are basic to a
discussion of the problem.
The prevailing rule seems to be that one may resist an illegal
arrest just as he can resist any other assault on his person.2 But in
offering such resistance he may utilize only such force as is com-
mensurate with the injury threatened to him.3 The person at-
tempting the illegal arrest is a wrongdoer and may be resisted in
self defense.4 This rule is grounded on the theory that the right
to personal liberty is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed
every citizen, and that a citizen of a certainty should have the
privilege of jealously protecting a right so basic to the American
way of life.
Though one may resist an illegal arrest using no more force
than is necessary, no one has a right to il an officer or individual
attempting an illegal arrest unless the arrester by his actions puts
the arrestee in fear of death or great bodily harm. In short, the
law will not sanction a principle that would justify taking a
human life simply to prevent an unlawful imprisonment.5 The
general rule was stated as follows in Wilkinson v. State:6
'RBESTATEMENT, CmmAL PRocEDuRE, see. 3 (1931); U.S. CONST. AMEND.
IV; CL.nx, CmnNsmAL PROCEDURE 32, 33 (2d ed. 1918).26 C.J.S. 613 (1937); 4 AW. Jun. 63 (1936)- But see State v. Cupton, 166
N.C. 257, 80 S.E. 989 (1914), where it was in effect said that though a warrant
of arrest may be defective in form, if it issued for a crime in the justice's jurisdic-
tion, the officer to whom it is directed, if a regular officer, is protected thereby
against assault by the person to be arrested. The arrestee should in such case sub-
mit to the arrest and assert his right to better warrant at the hearing instead of
defying the officer and assuming a hostile attitude towards him.
' Roberson v. State, 53 Ark. 515, 14 S.W. 902 (1890); Neely v. Comm., 123
Ky. 1, 93 S.W. 596 (1906); State v. Gum, 68 W. Va. 105, 69 S.E. 463 (1910);
4 AM. Jun. 63 (1936).
'Wilkinson v. State, 143 Miss. 324, 108 So. 711, 46 A.L.R. 895 (1926);
Meirs v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. Rep. 47, 29 S.W. 1074 (1895).
' Williams v. State, 44 Ala. 41 (1870); State v. Clark, 64 W. Va. 625, 63 S.E.
402 (1908); see also Creighton v. Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 103, 108, 4 Am. St. Rep.
193, 196 (1886), where it was said: "At first impression it would seem that in
the attempt to deprive one wrongfully of his personal liberty, the party assaulted
should be permitted to use all the force necessary to release himself from the
unlawful arrest or to prevent the imprisonment; for life being valueless without
liberty, the modes of defense for the preservation of human life should be allowed
for the maintenance of human liberty . . . but liberty can be secured by a resort
to laws." 'Id. at 835, 108 So. at 712.
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The courts generally hold that the right to resist
an unlawful arrest is a phase of the right of self-defense;
that as in other cases of self-defense the person sought to be
arrested is justified in taking life only when he has reason-
able ground to apprehend that he is in imminent danger of
death or great bodily harm; that he is not justified in killing
merely for the purpose of resisting an unlawful arrest or
other restraint upon his liberty, where the only injury
which could be reasonably apprehended is an unlawful de-
tention for a short time or other injury short of death or
great bodily harm; that, the officer attempting to make an
unlawful arrest is simply the aggressor in the difficulty, and
stands in the shoes of any other aggressor in a like dif-
ficulty.7
When a homicide is committed by one resisting an unlawful
arrest, though the courts are generally agreed that the homicide is
not justified unless the resisting party is threatened with death or
great bodily harm, they are not in agreement as to the degree of
homicide of which the killer is guilty.
It should also be noted that before any of the above principles
can be applied, the arrestee must have knowledge that the
warrant under which the arrest is being effected is invalid and
thus that the arrest is illegal. Because of this fact the courts have
generally recognized that there may be two types of defects
rendering a warrant defective-those which are apparent on the
face of the process itself, and those which, though present, are
not apparent on the face of the warrant. In discussing the rights
of an arrestee under a defective warrant it thus becomes clear
that some distinction must be made between these two types of
defects. For the want of a better classification it is proposed that
the terms "patent" and "latent" be adopted to describe these two
types of defects. Those warrants in which the defect is apparent
on the face of the process will hereafter be designated patently
defective warrants and those warrants which, though valid and
fair on their face, are burdened with some unseen defect will be
called latently defective warrants.
Applying these general principles to the specific problem
under discussion, then, it would seem that a party who is
0143 Miss. 324, 108 So. 711 (1926).
NoTEs Aim Coors
threatened with an arrest under a warrant which to his knowl-
edge is defective has an inherent right to resist the arrest using
such force as is necessary to prevent the injury threatened, short
of killing the officer. Thus the basic problem posed resolves itself
into the following question: If an arrestee who is not threatened
with death or great bodily harm kills the arresting officer in re-
sisting an arrest under a defective warrant, should he be guilty of
murder, or should the fact that the arrest was illegal reduce the
crime to manslaughter? Apparently there are three views on
this question. The first holds that such a party is never guilty of
more than manslaughter unless actual malice is shown; the second
holds that he is always guilty of murder; and the third holds that
if the illegality of the arrest in fact raised heat of passion within
the breast of the arrestee, his offense should be reduced from
murder to manslaughter. For a complete understanding of the
problem it is necessary that these three views be treated sep-
arately.
(A) The View that the Offense is Always Manslaughter. In
reality there are two separate and distinct rationalizations behind
this view.
The first rationalization ignores the fact that a warrant of
arrest may be either patently or latently defective and simply
makes the test the legality or illegality of the arrest. In short this
rationalization holds that if the arrest is illegal and the arrestee
in resisting it kills the officer, the illegality of the arrest without
more will reduce the crime to manslaughter. Utilizing this test
it is obvious that whether the warrant be patently or latently
defective would be of no significance, because in either situation
the arrest would be illegal and therefore the homicide could be
of no greater degree than manslaughter unless express malice is
affirmatively proved. In Rafferty v. People" the magistrate issued
warrants in blank to be filled in by the police sergeant when
occasion arose; the sergeant, who had no authority to do so, filled
in one of the warrants directing officer X to arrest the accused.
X was killed by the accused while attempting to execute this
defective warrant, which on its face appeared valid in all respects.
869 IIl. 111 (1873); but in Rafferty v. People, 72 IMI. 37 (1874); the de-
fendant was convicted of murder on the grounds that express malice was proved.
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The court held that the accused could be guilty of no more than
manslaughter because the arrest was in fact illegal.'
The second rationalization under which it is held that a
homicide effected while resisting an illegal arrest can only be
manslaughter unless actual malice is shown is based on the pre-
sumption that an illegal arrest always raises heat of passion in the
party to be arrested. In Briggs v. Commonwealth'0 it was said:
The true view of the law, in reason, is that when
the mere fact of an illegal arrest, attempted or consumated,
appears, if the one suffering it kills the officer or other ar-
resting person, whether with a deadly weapon or by other
means, he may rely on the presumption that his mind was
beclouded by passion, but if actual malice is affirmatively
proved, the homicide will be murder."
(B) The View that the Offense is Always Murder. Some
courts take the view that the illegality of an arrest should never
in and of itself be enough provocation to render a homicide com-
mitted in resisting the arrest manslaughter instead of murder.
These courts almost invariably fall back on the classical old
English decision of Mackalley's Case12 where on an indictment for
killing a sergeant of the mace who was attempting to execute a
process defective in form, it was resolved:
... that if any sheriff, under-sheriff, serjeant of
officer, who hath execution of process, be slain in doing his
duty, it is murder in him who kills him, although there were
not any former malice betwixt them; for the executing of
process is the life of the law: and therefore he who kills him
shall lose his life; for that offense is contra potestatem
regis et legis; and therefore in such case there needs not any
inquiry of malice.13
While in exceptional situations this view might lead to a just
result, it is believed that in a vastly greater number of cases it is
'However a majority of the jurisdictions in this country do not allow a latent
defect in a warrant of arrest to reduce the ldling of an officer to manslaughter, but
instead follow the reasoning set forth in Bullock v. State, 65 N.J.L. 557, 47 Ad. 62,
67 (1900).
82 Va. 554 (1886).
"Id. at 565; see also Noles v. State, 24 Ala. 672 (1854).
" Cro. Jac. 279, 79 Eng. Rep. 239 (1611).
Id. at 280, 79 Eng. Rep. at 240; see also People v. Bradley, 28 Cal. App.
Rep. 44, 46, 186 Pac. 955, 956 (1915); Boyd v. State, 17 Ga. 194 (1855); Alsop
v. Commonwealth, 4 Ky. Law Rep. 547 (1882).
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far too harsh, and therefore will oft-times work an injustice on
one who was truly provoked by heat of passion to kill the officer
illegally attempting to arrest him.
(C) The View that the Offense is Manslaughter-If and Only
If the Illegality of the Arrest in Fact Raised Heat of Passion in
the Killer. The courts that follow this view go forward on the
theory that even though the arrest was illegal it does not neces-
sarily follow that a homicide committed while resisting it should
be reduced to manslaughter. There remains still the question on
the evidence whether the killing was without malice and arose
solely from a sudden heat of passion provoked by the illegal
arrest. The indulgence which the law shows in the case of man-
slaughter is to the weakness of human nature and not to its
wickedness. In Reg v. Allen and Others4 K and D were arrested
in England upon Irish warrants which were not valid in England.
While these two prisoners were being transported in a police van,
the defendants attacked the van for the purpose of rescuing them
and in the ensuing fight an officer was killed. It was established
that the illegality of the warrants was unknown to the defendants.
The court held the defendants guilty of murder, not manslaughter,
and in the course of the opinion it was said:
It was further manifest that they attempted the
rescue in perfect ignorance of any defect in the warrant, and
that they knew well that if there was any defect in the war-
rant, or illegality in the custody, that the courts of law were
open to an application for their release from custody. We
think it would be monstrous to suppose that under such cir-
cumstances, even if the justice did make an informal war-
rant, it could possibly justify the slaughter of an officer in
charge of the prisoners, or reduce such slaughter to the
crime of manslaughter.15
It would appear then, that under this theory in no case could
one who killed an officer executing a latently defective warrant
have the crime reduced from murder to manslaughter because
of the illegality of the arrest where he had knowledge that the
person executing the process was an officer, but was not on notice
that the proces was defective. This is true because the killer
would have no grounds for the contention that he killed out of
16 17 Law Times 222 (1867). 15Id. at 226.
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heat of passion raised by the illegality of the act since he would
have no reason to know that the arrest was illegal.
Conclusion
As pointed out in the above discussion, three views as to the
degree of guilt of an arrestee who kills an officer to prevent unlaw-
ful arrest have been recognized by the courts. As to the first view
is it not rather irrational to say that if the arrest is illegal the
arrestee's crime in killing the officer can never be more than man-
slaughter because there is a presumption that an illegal arrest
always raises heat of pasion in the party to be arrested? If the
arrest is under a warrant valid on its face but latently defective,
it is more than probable that neither the officer not the arrestee
will be on notice of the defect, and thus to all parties involved
the arrest will appear legal. In such a situation the officer must
be protected, and there are no grounds for the presumption of
heat of passion if the arrestee is ignorant of the illegality of the
officer's act. In such a case even a limited resistance is probably
unjustified since the arrestee has recourse to the courts if the
process should prove to be in fact illegal. On the other hand, it
is unreasonably harsh to hold that if the arrestee, involved in an
illegal arrest, kills the arresting officer he is always guilty of
murder. If the warrant under which the arrest is made is patently
defective is there not a strong possibility that heat of passion may
be raised in the party whose liberty is illegally threatened? Should
not the state be required to discredit such possibility and show
instead that there was actual malice before the crime can be
deemed murder?
Assuming the above reasoning to be correct the only view
remaining is that if the victim of an illegal arrest kills the officer
in resisting the arrest, his crime will be reduced from murder to
manslaughter if, but only if, heat of passion is actually raised
within him; if actual malice can be shown he is unquestionably
guilty of murder. This it is submitted, is a statement of the better
view and is the one followed in the majority of the jurisdictions.
CGi.#,is R. Imom
